Attorneys -- Disbarment -- Failure to Comply with Technical Requirements of Disbarment Statute by Little, James M., Jr.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 10 | Number 1 Article 12
12-1-1931
Attorneys -- Disbarment -- Failure to Comply with
Technical Requirements of Disbarment Statute
James M. Little Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
James M. Little Jr., Attorneys -- Disbarment -- Failure to Comply with Technical Requirements of Disbarment Statute, 10 N.C. L. Rev. 58
(1931).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol10/iss1/12
58 THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
present entrance requirement of two years of college work. The
new trustee regulation requiring three years of college preparation
for entrance to the Law School will take effect in September, 1932.
For the first time, the law students have a separate dormitory of
their own. The Carr Building, adjacent to the Law Building, has
been remodeled and set aside for this purpose. It now houses its
capacity of 62, all of whom are students in the Law School.
Last winter the faculty of the Law School presented 10 bills to
the General Assembly, proposing changes in the procedural law and,
to a less extent, changes in the substantive law of the state. Four of
these bills became law, including the Uniform Declaratory Judgment
Act, as slightly revised by Professor Atwell C. McIntosh of the Law
School. To continue the process of law-school participation in law-
making thus begun, the legislature created the Law Improvement
Commission, to consist of representatives of the Wake Forest, Duke
and North Carolina law faculties, and of the laity and the bench and
bar. Judge George W. Connor of the Supreme Court is chairman
and Albert Coates of the Law School, secretary. The North Car-
olina Judicial Conference was abolished.
The new Constitutional Revision Commission has accepted the
Law School's offer of research assistance in connection with its work,
and has invited the Wake Forest College and Duke University Law
Schools to participate. In close relation to this work, Professor R. I-.
Wettach will conduct during the spring semester, a research course
in North Carolina Constitutional Law, with especial emphasis on the
need for amendment and revision.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Atto'rneys-Disbarment-Failure to Comply with Technical
Requirements of Disbarment Statute.
The case of Grievance Committee v. Strickland' is the first in
which disbarment proceedings founded upon a charge of "ambulance
chasing" have been reviewed by the North Carolina Supreme Court.
The accusation, brought by the Grievance Committee of the State
Bar Association, was based upon the affidavit of Biggers, but the
accused was found guilty only on evidence furnished by Fellos,
Committee on Grievances of the State Bar Association v. Strickland, 200
N. C. 630, 158 S. E. 110 (1931).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
whose name appeared for the first time in the solicitor's citation.
Held, disbarment reversed, on the ground that the bounds of the
statute governing such proceedings had been exceeded.
Only in one instance2 has a disbarment proceeding been decided
on appeal unfavorably to a North Carolina attorney. The other de-
cisions rest on one of three technical considerations: (1) strict con-
struction of the statute, 3 (2) dubiously-worded disavowals, 4 and (3)
meticulous attention to terminology.5
By the majority of decisions, an action for disbarment is not
criminal in nature, but rather civil or even sui generis, and is to be
governed, not by the technical nicety of criminal pleadings, but by
rules peculiar to itself." Likewise, nearly all courts agree that pun-
ishment of the offending attorney is neither the primary nor the ulti-
mate purpose of the proceeding, but that it is invoked mainly to
protect the courts, the profession, and the public from ministration
by persons unfit to practice.7 If the accused is fully and fairly in-
formed of the general nature of the charges against him, and in a
broad sense the proof corresponds with the allegations, it has been
held that slight variations between proof and allegation are imma-
2State v. Johnson, 171 N. C. 799, 88 S. E. 437 (1916).
'Ex parte Schenck, 65 N. C. 353 (1871) (publishing letter derogatory to
superior court judge) ; Kane v. Haywood, 66 N. C. 1 (1872) (failure to account
for client's money).4In re Moore, 63 N. C. 397 (1869) [disavowal admits purpose (of pub-
lication) was to express disapprobation of the conduct of individuals occupy-
ing high judicial stations] ; Ex parte Biggs, 64 N. C. 202 (1870) (D insisted
that by becoming an attorney, he did not surrender any right as editor, and as
such was entitled "to fully comment on all public officers").
'In re Ebbs, 150 N. C. 44, 63 S. E. 190 (1908) ("convicted" held not
equivalent to "guilty").
'Philbrook v. Newman, 85 Fed. 139 (Circuit Court, Cal., 1898); Maloney
v. State, 182 Ark. 510, 32 S. W. (2nd) 423 (1930) ; Gould v. State, 127 So.
309 (1930) ; In re Ulmer, 268 Mass. 373, 167 N. E. 749 (1929) ; Re Vaughan,
189 Cal. 491, 209 Pac. 353 (1922); People v. Stonecipher, 171 Ill. 506, 111
N. E. 496 (1916) (deposition taken in another state held admissible) ; It re
Breidt, 84 N. J. Eq. 222, 94 Atl. 214 (1915) ; State v. Peck, 88 Conn. 447, 91
At. 274 (1914) ; Bar Association v. Scott, 209 Mass. 200, 95 N. E. 402 (1911)
fraud proved in instance other than that named in petition) ; In re Ebbs, supra
note 5; It re Smith, 73 Kan. 743, 85 Pac. 584 (1906); (1921) MINN. L. REv.
141; (1921) CAT.. L. REv. 484. Contra: In re Eaton, 235 N. W. 587 (1931).
'McIntosh v. State Bar, 211 Cal. 261, 294 Pac. 1067 (1930); Gould v. State,
supra note 6; State v. Kern, 233 N. W. 629 (1930); In re Egan, 52 S. D.
394, 218 N. W. 1 (1928) ; State v. Ledbetter, 127 Okla. 85, 260 Pac. 454 (1927) ;
Re Stolen, 193 Wis. 602, 214 N. W. 379 (1927); Re Vaughan, supra note 6;
Re Kerl, 32 Idaho 737, 188 Pac. 40 (1920) ; In re Rouss, 221 N. Y. 81, 116
N. E. 782 (1917) ; In re Breidt, supra note 6; Bar Association v. Greenhood,
168 Mass. 169, 46 N. E. 568 (1897) ; Ex parte Wall, 107 U. S. 265, 2 Sup. Ct.
569 (1882) (leading case); (1921) 5 MINN. L. REv. 141.
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terial.8 There is also authority for the statements that where the
charges are sufficient and clearly apparent upon the face of the com-
plaint, the procedure by which the matter is brought to the attention
of the court need not comply with any particular statutory or com-
mon-law form, and that discrepancies not invading some substantial
right of the respondent are not cause for reversal.9 Statutes, while
they may set up additional grounds for disbarment or define the
procedure to be utilized, are usually held to be merely cumulative,
and not to limit or impair the inherent constitutional right of the
court to deal with such cases in a proper, though non-statutory,
way ;1o nor should they be construed as importing to the general as-
sembly an intention to abridge such power.11
The statement by the court in the principal case, supported by
cases not dealing with disbarment, that a statutory method of pro-
cedure, if provided, "is exclusive and must be first resorted to and
in the manner specified therein," does not find support in "courts
everywhere."'1 2 But, conceding the statutory provisions to be the
basis of the action, the majority opinion appears to have miscon-
strued the requirements of the statute. Though it is provided that
proceedings "shall be instituted and prosecuted only by the Commit-
tee on Grievances of the North Carolina State Bar Association,"'1
'Bar Association of Boston v. Scott, supra note 6.
'In re Ulmer, supra note 6; it re Bailey, 30 Ariz. 407, 248 Pac. 29 (1926);
State v. Peck, supra note 6 (complaint in narrative form) ; Hess v. Conway,
93 Kan. 246, 144 Pac. 205 (1914) ; Bar Association v. Scott, supra note 6; In
re Smith, supra note 6; State v. Hays, 64 W. Va. 45, 61 S. E. 355 (1908) ; Bar
Association v. Greenhood, supra note 7; it re Lowenthal, 78 Cal. 427, 21 Pac.
7 (1889) (facts stated in narrative form, no allegations connecting them with
charges) ; Ex parte Wall, supra note 7.
"In re Eaton, supra note 6; Gould v. State, supra note 6;, In re Royall, 34
N. M. 554, 286 Pac. 156 (1930); Re Cohen, 261 Mass. 484, 159 N. E. 495
(1928) ; State v. Cannon, 196 Wis. 534, 221 N. W. 603 (1928) ; Re Law Asso-
ciation, 288 Pa. 331, 135 Atl. 732 (1927); State v. Ledbetter, supra note 7;
Hertz v. U. S., 18 F. (2nd) 52 (C. C. A. Eighth Circuit, 1927) ; In re Wolfe's
Disbarment, 288 Pa. 331, 135 Atl. 732 (1927) ; State v. Reynolds, 22 N. M. 1,
158 Pac. 413 (1916); People v. Harris, 273 Ill. 413, 112 N. E. 978 (1916)
(allowing of testimony by unauthorized relator held no objection) ; Bar Com-
missioners v. Sullivan, 35 Okla. 745, 131 Pac. 703 (1912) ; Wernimont v. State,
101 Ark. 210, 142 S. W. 194 (1911) ; It re Tharcher, 80 Ohio St. 492, 89 N. E.
39 (1909) ; In re Egan, 22 S. D. 355, 117 N. W. 874 (1908) ; Ex parte Schenck,
supra note 3; (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 1154; (1928) 13 MiNN. L. REv. 62; see
Snyder's Case, 301 Pa. 276, 152 Atl. 33. (1930).
'lit re Egan, supra note 10; Hale v. State, 55 Ohio St. 210, 45 N. E. 199
(1896).
ni re Bailey, supra note 9; Re Law Association, supra note 10; In re
Wolfe's Disbarment, supra note 10; Bar Commissioners v. Sullivan, supra
note 10; In re Thatcher, supra note 10.
'N. C. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1927) §208.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
there is also a requirement that in all cases the solicitor shall "appear
and prosecute the accusation and be responsible for the faithful dis-
charge of the duties required of him." 14  It is submitted that the
statute requires only that charges be initiated or "instituted" by the
grievance committee, and the solicitor, in securing additional affi-
davits, merely "faithfully discharged" his duties.15
JAMES M. LITTLE, JR.
Bankruptcy-Proof of Contingent Claims.
The Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Maynard
v. Elliott' held that the liability of a bankrupt as endorser of nego-
tiable notes, some of which did not mature for more than a year after
the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, was a provable claim against
his estate.
Section 63 of the present bankruptcy act in providing for claims
provable against the estate of a bankrupt makes no specific provision
for the proof of contingent claims.2 The status of the claim at the
time of the filing of the petition determines whether or not it is prov-
able.3 Hence the provability of contingent claims founded upon con-
tract depends on whether subdivision (1)4 of this section to the
N. C. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1927) §214.See People v. Harris, supra note 10.
Cited in appellant's brief were: In re Evans, 130 Pac. 217 (Utah, 1913);
Bar Association v. Sullivan, 185 Cal. 621, 198 Pac. 7 (1921) ; In re Hudson,
36 Pac. 812 (Cal., 1894) ; Grievance Committee v. Ennis, 84 Conn. 594, 80 Atl.
767 (1911) ; and People v. Matthews, 217 Ill. 94, 75 N. E. 444 (1905). Three
of these would seem to be not in point The first decision rests upon the fact
that the petitioners were condemned unheard on charges concerning which no
evidence had been adduced; in the second ease no misconduct other than that
specifically charged was alleged in the accusation or included in charges filed;
and the last reversal was due to the lack of an affidavit to support the in-
formation. Nor did the fourth case turn alone on the technical point involved,
since the deficiency in the complaint was only "another reason" for setting
aside the order for suspension.
1283 U. S. 273, 51 Sup. Ct. 390, 75 L. ed. 518 (1931) [reversing 40 F. (2d)
17 (C. C. A. 6th, 1930)].
'30 Stat. 562 (1898) 11 U. S. C. A. §103 (1927). "A contingent claim is one
as to which it remains uncertain, at the time of the filing of the petition in bank-
ruptcy, whether or not the bankrupt will ever become liable to pay it." In re
Mullings Clothing Co., 238 Fed. 58, 67 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1916) ; (1927) 12 MiNN.
L. Rav. 60, n. 1.
'Zavelo v. Reeves, 227 U. S. 625, 33 Sup. Ct. 365, 57 L. ed. 676 (1913);
Swartz v. Fourth National Bank, 117 Fed. 1 (C. C. A. 8th, 1902) ; In re Bing-
ham, 94 Fed. 796 (D. Vt. 1899).
" (A) Debts of the bankrupt may be proved and allowed against his estate
which are (1) a fixed liability, as evidenced by a judgment or an instrument
in writing, absolutely owing at the time of the filing of the petition against
him,... Bankruptcy Act, of 1898, mipra note 2.
